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Humans routinely formulate plans in domains so complex that even
the most powerful computers are taxed. To do so, they seem to
avail themselves of many strategies and heuristics that efficiently
simplify, approximate, and hierarchically decompose hard tasks
into simpler subtasks. Theoretical and cognitive research has re-
vealed several such strategies; however, little is known about their
establishment, interaction, and efficiency. Here, we use model-
based behavioral analysis to provide a detailed examination of the
performance of human subjects in a moderately deep planning task.
We find that subjects exploit the structure of the domain to establish
subgoals in a way that achieves a nearly maximal reduction in the
cost of computing values of choices, but then combine partial
searches with greedy local steps to solve subtasks, and malad-
aptively prune the decision trees of subtasks in a reflexive manner
upon encountering salient losses. Subjects come idiosyncratically
to favor particular sequences of actions to achieve subgoals,
creating novel complex actions or “options.”
planning | hierarchical reinforcement learning | memoization | pruning
Humans and other animals often face complex tasks andenvironments in which they have to plan and execute long
sequences of appropriate actions to achieve distant goals. One
can represent the space of future actions and outcomes as a tree;
such trees grow inordinately (often exponentially) large as a
function of the length of the sequence (i.e., the depth of the
tree). Rather little is definitively known about how this compu-
tational complexity is addressed. Work in the fields of re-
inforcement learning and artificial intelligence has suggested
a number of heuristics that we describe below, namely, hacking,
hierarchies, hoarding, and habitization (1–4). Various tasks have
been designed to highlight individual heuristics; though how
subjects generate and combine them without clear instruction
has not been well characterized (however, see refs. 5 and 6).
We previously designed a moderately deep planning problem
to elicit a specific heuristic, in this case hacking or pruning of the
decision tree (4). However, the task contains many of the ele-
ments that make choosing appropriately tricky in general. Thus,
we closely examined the nature of, and individual differences
between, the performance of subjects, shedding light on the in-
teraction of heuristics in the self-generation of adaptive control
when faced with a complex planning problem.
Subjects had to plan a path through a maze so as to maximize
their cumulative earnings. On each trial, they were placed in
a random state and were asked to plan to a depth of 3, 4, or 5
moves (Fig. 1 A and B). Because each depth involved a binary
choice, planning to depths 3, 4, and 5 corresponded to choosing
among a set of 8, 16, or 32 possible sequences. We previously
found that the large immediate losses at particular branch points
in the tree (the red transitions) encouraged subjects to eliminate
possibly lucrative subbranches beneath those points (4). This
corresponds to suboptimal pruning or “hacking” of the decision
tree (Fig. 1C). The analyses presented below show that this was
by no means the only strategy subjects used.
Hierarchical task decomposition licenses strategies for reducing
computational burdens based on divide and conquer (2, 7) or
“chunking” (5, 8–12). The resulting divided problems are easier to
conquer because chunks are smaller and ignore aspects of the en-
vironment that do not impinge on their domains. The solutions to
the subproblems can then be treated as larger-scale actions, often
called macroactions or options (1). These simplify solving complex
tasks by providing a way of building large decision trees out of
smaller numbers of intermediate-sized parts (the macroactions)
rather than larger numbers of smaller parts (each individual action).
The downside is potential suboptimality. We use the precise form
of suboptimality that our subjects exhibited to argue that they hi-
erarchically fragmented the planning problems: Deep problems
were solved by concatenating solutions to sequences of shallower
problems (e.g., greedily adopting as a depth-5 solution the best
depth-3 solution followed by the best remaining depth-2 solution;
Fig. 1D). We then asked a critical question that has eluded previous
approaches to hierarchical control, namely the degree to which the
fragmentation is actually computationally advantageous—is the
benefit of divide and conquer appropriately realized?
A third, “hoarding” heuristic is known as memoization. If
subjects are repeatedly faced with the task of finding a good
policy at a state, then rather than building and searching the
decision tree each time it is sensible to recall a previous solution
and use that. If the previous solution cannot be guaranteed to be
correct, then storing and deciding among several past solutions
could be wise. When such storage and recall are probabilistic, the
heuristic is stochastic memoization. It has been most extensively
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investigated in computational linguistics (13–15), and recently
imported into decision making (16). Hoarding and hierarchies
interact closely: Stored solutions can exactly be considered as
macroactions or chunks, and so stochastic memoization can be
seen as an answer to another poorly explored question, namely,
how hierarchical decompositions arise. In particular, we will see
that different subjects fragmented the task in idiosyncratic ways,
putatively based on the way that they memoized.
We used both flexible and constrained statistical analyses to
examine the use of these heuristics. For the constrained analyses,
we stipulated a particular mathematical form for each cognitive
process and implemented it in a model that, after its parameters
had been fit, reported the likelihood of the subjects’ choices.
More complex models should provide better fits and were pe-
nalized by computing integrated Bayesian information criterion
(iBIC) scores, which approximate Bayes factors (4, 17). We
tested models including and excluding particular cognitive pro-
cesses. Those processes present in the model with the best iBIC
score were taken as putatively present in subjects’ decision
making. Importantly, this approach always tests the ability of the
hypothesized set of cognitive processes to account for the entire
dataset, rather than only hand-selected aspects of the data.
Results
Subjects were trained extensively on both the transition matrix and
the rewards associated with each of the transitions. As previously
reported (4), subjects “pruned” (Fig. 1C) extensively, with out-
comes distal to large losses being discounted at a faster rate
than outcomes distal to non-large loss outcomes (Supporting In-
formation, Pruning and Fig. S1). We previously found this to be
insensitive to the actual size of the large loss and to reduce
earnings overall, and therefore interpreted it as a reflexive “Pav-
lovian” influence on goal-directed decisions. All findings below
incorporate and extend these findings, that is, we correct for them
throughout, and ultimately reassess pruning in the light of the
more refined analyses of other heuristics. The time pressures
imposed in this version of task, and the fact that planning had to
be completed before any move was registered, led to few apparent
differences in choices relative to the original version (4).
Fragmenting Decisions. We first looked for a very simple type of
hierarchy, whereby a smaller initial subproblem of a difficult task is
addressed greedily, leaving whatever remains to be solved in turn.
It seemed that subjects indeed adopted this approach. For instance,
starting from state 1, the optimal path for a depth-3 problem is
1–2–3–4, whereas for a depth-4 problem it is 1–2–5–1–2. However,
subjects had a strong predilection for the path 1–2–3–4–2 (Fig. S2,
first column, middle row). A similar pattern was qualitatively ob-
served throughout (other panels of Fig. S2). To quantify this sta-
tistically, we computed each subject’s distribution over depth-3
sequences (cf. Fig. S2) in the depth-3 problems and at the begin-
ning of depth-4 problems and then performed Spearman rank
correlation between these distributions over choice sequences. The
correlation was on average 0.44. Comparison with correlations
obtained from permutations of the distributions revealed that it
was individually significant (P < .05) for 35/37 subjects (94%).
Repeating the analysis by comparing the initial depth-4 sequences
of depth-5 choices to the depth-4 choices, the correlation was on
average 0.47 and individually significant in all subjects.
Subjects thus seemed to solve harder problems hierarchically, by
exploiting the solutions to fragments, which are themselves smaller
problems. However, just as there are many different ways of
subdividing a complex task into simpler subtasks, there are many
ways simpler problem solutions could be substituted into harder
problems. To measure directly the hierarchical decomposition and
avoid the potential biases in the above simple analysis, we fitted an
exploratory model with sufficient flexibility to capture all possible
fragmentations (i.e., for each trial, we asked which fragmented
decomposition best fitted subjects’ actual choices).
In this model, we first examined fragment endpoints (red as-
terisk in Fig. 1D). To do so, we extracted all fragmented choices,
that is, we extracted the maximum a posteriori decomposition of
each subject’s choices, determined the start and endpoints of each
fragment, and constructed histograms of endpoints as a function
of the fragment origin. Fig. 2A, Left shows that fragments tended
to terminate in state 2 irrespective of the start state (seen as a dark
horizontal band), or in the next state around the outer ring of the
maze (seen as a dark band below the diagonal). This pattern
accounted for 90% of target end states on average (range 0.83–
0.99) and was present in all subjects above chance (P < 10−10 for
each; Supporting Information, Optimal Fragmentation and Fig. S3).
Fragments of length 1 tended to end in the next state along the
circle (Fig. 2A, Middle), whereas fragments of greater length
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Fig. 1. Task. (A) Task display. On each trial, subjects saw six boxes. The bright box indicated the randomly chosen starting location. The number of moves to plan
was displayed at the top. During the decision time of 9 s, subjects had to plan between three and five moves. Then, during the input time of 2.5 s, they had to enter
their plan as a single sequence of right/left button presses in one go and without immediate feedback as to what state they were currently in or what rewards they
had earned in the choice sequence so far. After the entire sequence had been entered, the chosen sequence and the rewards earned were displayed in the order in
which they had been entered. Failure to enter a button press sequence of the right length in the given time resulted in a penalty of –200 pence. (B) Task structure.
Subjects were placed in one of the six boxes (“states”) at the beginning of each trial and had to plan a path through the maze that maximized their total outcomes
earned. From each state, two successor states could be reached deterministically by pressing either the right (dashed lines) or left (solid lines) key. For example, from
state 1, state 4 could be reached by pressing left–left–right. Each transition resulted in a deterministic reward or loss. Red arrows, for instance, denote large salient
losses of –70 points. The possible transitions were never displayed on screen. (C) Pruning. The decision tree faced by subjects for a depth-3 problem starting in state 3.
When encountering one of the large losses (−70, red arrows in B) the search along that subtree is terminated. The blue parts of the tree would thereby not be
evaluated and thus the cost of computation would be reduced. In this case, pruning leads to a suboptimal sequence appearing as being optimal. (D) Hierarchical
fragmentation of the same problem. Rather than evaluating the entire depth-3 tree, a 2–1 fragmentation would first search the tree up to depth 2 (large green area),
choose a depth-2 sequence (black arrow), and then search the remaining depth-1 tree (bottom right green area). The blue area of the tree is again not evaluated.
Optimal choices in the fragmented tree may miss the overall optimal sequence, which in this case would be on the far left of the tree. If a subject emitted the
sequence on the far right, this sequence would bemore likely under the fragmentation 2–1 than under a nonfragmented tree of full depth 3. The effective “subgoal”
corresponding to the target of the first fragment (the end state of the subsequence resulting from the first part of the fragmentation) is indicated by a red asterisk.
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terminated in state 2 irrespective of where they started (Fig. 2A,
Right) and typically reaped the big reward when transitioning from
state 1. Importantly, this structure was stable through the hierar-
chical decomposition: It was present when considering only the
first fragment at the root of the decision tree and also when
considering only the second fragment inside the decision tree (Fig.
S4A). Finally, we examined the delays between button presses.
Button press delays preceding depth-1 fragments were on average
9.7ms longer than the decision time before longer fragments
[t(36) = 2.17, P = 0.037]. Because the computational requirement
for shorter fragments is smaller than that for long fragments, this
suggests that emitting a short fragment is the result of failed
deeper searches. Thus, subjects seemed to build decision trees
repeatedly until they found a path through the salient reward
(transitioning from state 1 to 2); failing this, they would move one
step along the circle (the off-diagonal band) and then reattempt to
build a decision tree that would lead them to state 2. This suggests
that subjects might have treated state 2 as a subgoal, which makes
intuitive sense because this usually corresponds to earning the
large reward of +140 when reached from state 1.
The driving force behind fragmentation should be the re-
duction in computational cost, a simple measure of which is the
total number of computations—here largely additions—required
to sum the rewards along all paths in a tree. A full evaluation of
a depth-3 tree would require a sum of three outcomes for each of
the eight arms, that is, 3× 8= 24 computations, and more gen-
erally d× 2d computations for a depth-d tree. Using this measure
of computational cost, the fragmentation in Fig. 1D would re-
quire evaluation of a depth-2 and then a depth-1 tree, resulting
in ð2× 22Þ+ ð1× 21Þ= 10 computations (i.e., a reduction of the
computational cost by more than 50%) (Fig. 1D). (The results
remain the same when quantifying the cost of using dynamic
programming, which is in general more efficient; see Supporting
Information, Optimal Fragmentation for further details.) Given
these costs, one can identify, for each state–depth problem, the
fragmentation with the least computational cost that still selects
the optimal choice. The distribution over fragment endpoints for
the optimal decomposition is shown in Fig. 2B and matches the
empirically inferred distributions well (Fig. 2A). Fig. 3 A and B
show that the frequency of fragment depths and the overall
distribution over end states also match the optimal distribution
well. This suggests that participants chose a hierarchical task
decomposition that nearly optimally reduced computational cost.
For this task, the near-optimal fragmentation can be interpreted
in terms of two organizing principles: one aligned with the per-
ceptually salient transition structure (the ring of states) and the
other with the reinforcement structure (the large rewards).
The distribution of fragment endpoints showed substantial
structure that was present in every single subject. However, pre-
cisely because of the exploratory intention to allow for the discovery
of any target pattern, this model (called “baseline + unrestricted
fragmentation”) enjoyed very many degrees of freedom. It was able
to reproduce the detailed choice patterns with high fidelity and
accounted for 64% of the variability (Fig. S2, blue line). However,
for the same reason, it overfitted the data. When integrating
over all fragmentations it had a worse iBIC score than the baseline
model without fragmentation (ΔiBIC = 682).
One way to capture the fragmentation structure would be to
build a process model (i.e., an account of how subjects actually
solve the metacontrol problem of decomposing a problem). This
is beyond the scope of the current work. However, in an effort to
constrain possible theoretical frameworks for this, we built a re-
duced model in which the full tree was replaced by the most
frequently used fragmented version of the tree for each partic-
ular subject. For instance, if the tree starting in state 3 was most
frequently decomposed into a tree of depth 2 followed by
a depth-1 tree, as displayed in Fig. 1D, then this unique frag-
mentation was assumed to be fixed for the entire experiment for
that state and depth. Fixing fragmentations for individuals
did not substantially alter the fragment endpoint distributions
(Fig. S4B) and the optimal pattern was still significantly present
in every subject (P < 10−10, binomial test). This model (“baseline +
restricted fragmentation”) improved the fit over the baseline
model (Fig. S5 A and B) and led to a substantial improvement in
formal model comparison (Fig. 3C). Importantly, this model was
as identifiable as the previous simpler models without fragmenta-
tion: We fitted each model to surrogate data generated from each
of the models and were always able to recover the correct model
(Supporting Information, Robustness of Inference and Table S1).
However, repeating this procedure, but now forcing all sub-
jects to decompose problems in the same manner, produced
a worse model (ΔiBIC = 116 compared with baseline model).
Thus, fragmentation strategies were stable within individuals, but
varied across different subjects. These results suggest that sub-
goals (the salient reward) and the decomposition of plans are
intimately related. They constrain the processes that generate
the fragmentation in the first place by identifying salient rein-
forcements as one central influence.
Stochastic Memoization. The fact that fragmentation is consistent
for a given subject but varies between different subjects suggests
the possibility that each subject generates one or a few possible
decompositions and then sticks with this limited collection. Differ-
ent subjects could generate and stick with different decompositions.
For instance, the subject might initially generate action sequences
through a laborious and computationally expensive tree search, but
later on simply reuse a past solution. This memoization process
(Fig. S6) would make later choices duplicate early fragmentations.
One sign of this could be in the temporal evolution of the use of
fragments, with those ultimately used most frequently coming to
dominate the distribution of fragments slowly. Thus, the distribution
over fragments should become more strongly concentrated on a few
fragments as the task progresses. We computed the probability
of fragments over time in the model “baseline + unrestricted
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fragmentation.” Fig. 3D shows that the frequency of the most
commonly used fragment increased gradually over time. In marked
contrast, the frequency with which all other choice fragments were
chosen decayed over time. Fig. 3E shows that this results in the
entropy over the fragment distribution decaying steeply.
Precisely because the task is too hard to solve perfectly, how-
ever, subjects cannot be sure that their previously computed choice
sequence really represents the best option. Stochastic memoization
refers to probabilistic, as opposed to deterministic, reuse. It is more
appropriate when the result of the computation might change if it
were recomputed, for instance due to incomplete or error-prone
computation. One formalization of such a process is inspired
by a method invented in computational linguistics (14, 16) that
employs a distribution known as the “Chinese restaurant process”
(CRP) (18). A CRP defines a probability distribution consisting of
two terms. The first term is proportional to the frequency of past
samples, whereas the second is the “base distribution” from which
samples are drawn in the first place. Applied to the current prob-
lem, this model assumes that the probability of emitting a particular
fragment is a weighted sum of two probabilities: the frequency of
that particular fragment in the collection of previous choices and
the probability that the fragment would be chosen anew if the so-
lution to the problem were recomputed (i.e., the probability under
the model baseline + restricted fragmentation). One critical feature
of the CRP statistical model is a gradual change, with the choice
probability being initially mainly driven by the base model (implying
recomputation), and later by subjects’ past choices (implying
stronger reuse later; see Eq. 2). This transfer from flexible but
costly computation to inflexible reliance on past experience is
reminiscent of arguments about the transfer from goal-directed
to habitual controllers (3, 19). However, by relying only on
which choice was emitted rather than on how good it was, it also
differs from certain formalizations of habits (3).
Fig. 3C and Fig. S5 show that the CRP addition in the aug-
mented model “baseline + restricted fragmentation + stochastic
memoization” outperformed the other models. Fitted reward sen-
sitivity parameters correlated closely with the true reward sizes
(mean of 0.994), and the target structure of the fragments was
again not substantially altered by the inclusion of stochastic
memoization (Fig. S4C). Adding stochastic memoization to the
model with unrestricted fragmentation also improved all measures
of model fit drastically (log likelihood improved for every subject
by 43 ± 22; 14% more variance explained; ΔiBIC = 4,162). The
same was true when controlling for an increase in the scaling of
the reward sensitivities [i.e., an increase in exploitation (20)] over
time (ΔiBIC = 86), and the model was also clearly identifiable
on surrogate datasets (Supporting Information, Robustness of In-
ference and Table S1). Finally, corresponding parameters were
highly correlated between all models tested (0.81 ± 0.06), suggesting
that parameters captured similar variability in different models.
Pruning. Finally, we considered whether the pruning that we had
previously seen using a similar task (4) might have been an artifact
of the incomplete analysis of fragmentation and memoization. The
baseline model that we fit included two pruning parameters: one
that discounted outcomes distal to large losses ðγSÞ and another
ðγGÞ that discounted distal outcomes in a value-independent
manner (Supporting Information, Pruning). However, the relation-
ship between these two parameters was not constrained by the
models. We examined the pruning parameters in the (overfitting)
model “baseline + unrestricted fragmentation + stochastic
memoization” because this model captured 78% of the variance,
and hence controlled most strongly for all other processes. Fig. 3F
shows that the continuation rate after outcomes other than large
losses was indistinguishable from 1 (and hence γG from zero), ar-
guing that the apparent general discounting factor whereby subjects
do not always look to the end of a tree is actually an epiphenom-
enon of hierarchical decomposition. However, every subject dis-
counted outcomes distant to large losses more steeply than other
distant outcomes (1− γS < 1− γG for 37/37 subjects). That is,
pruning remained a powerful effect even when controlling for
fragmentation and reuse as much as possible. Given that most
fragments were short enough to be computed fully (Fig. 3B;
however, note that owing to the length of the fragments the actual
number of choices being part of longer fragments is higher), this
also underscores our previous contention that pruning is a Pav-
lovian and reflexive response to aversive outcomes (4).
Intelligence Quotient. It has been suggested that subjects’ ability to
decompose problems into larger chunks is a key ingredient of
intelligence (21). The correlation between mean fragment length
and verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) measured by a reading test
was not significant (ρ = 0.08, P = 0.64).
Discussion
Our results suggest that humans naturally decompose problems in
a way that efficiently trades computational cost for performance;
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eral pruning”), 1− γG is indistinguishable from 1 for
every subject, meaning that these are not down-
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that the fragmentation of the task and the search strategy are
shaped both by salient rewards and by salient perceptual features of
the task; that subjects initially generate action sequences using
a tree-search process, but later rely on a stored representation
thereof; and that whenever subjects perform a mental search of
a decision tree they have a tendency to prune the tree upon en-
countering salient losses. These features operate cumulatively:
Subjects concurrently use multiple approximations when solving
planning tasks. We were able to find sufficient evidence in favor of
relatively complex models, potentially because of the high accuracy
exhibited by the subjects—Fig. S2, bottom row, shows that even at
depth 5 subjects rarely made very poor choices, even given the
relatively tight time constraints.
Fragmentation.The fact that the decomposition achieved in this task
is so close to the optimum (Fig. 3 A and B) is striking, particularly
because finding an optimal fragmentation is typically more difficult
than finding an optimal path. We were not able to address directly
how this was achieved (i.e., to build a process model) but rather
fitted all possible fragmentations to identify the relevant features.
One possibility is that the fragmentation arises from the exact
sequence in which parts of the decision tree are searched. A hint
comes from the suggestion that subjects search for the large re-
ward, accept whatever path they find that leads them there, and
then start recomputing from there onward. If they fail to find
a path to the large reward, they move one step along the circle and
try again. One immediate prediction from this is borne out:
Fragments that only move one step along the circle often repre-
sent a failure of the search and should take longer to produce than
longer fragments, even though they involve less computational
cost. Thus, if it is this strategy that drives subjects’ internal search
through the decision tree, then the optimality of the decom-
position hinges directly on the relationship between the subgoal
subjects aim for and the likelihood that this subgoal is on the
optimal path. In the present task, the large reward subgoal was
often on the optimal path. The fact that subjects rely so strongly
on the salient reward in defining the subgoal bears some re-
semblance to the impact the large losses have. We have previously
argued that the losses induce pruning in a reflexive, approximate,
Pavlovian manner (4), and it may be that the selection of subgoals
follows similar rules, as opposed to being derived in an adaptive
manner from a clever insight into the task structure and optimality
of various decompositions (see also ref. 21). It would certainly be
highly instructive to alter the reward matrix such that this is not
the case any more—one would expect the optimality of the de-
composition to then break (see Fig. S7 for a predicted fragment
endpoint distribution for a simple alteration to the reward matrix).
One might compare the hierarchical decomposition that we
observed with those that have been studied in frameworks that
explicitly set out to study hierarchical control (rather than to
study pruning, which was our original target). A central construct
in those tasks is that of a functional bottleneck—a state that makes
a worthy subgoal because many paths have to flow through it by
virtue of its position in state space (22–27). In our task, no state
has this status—all states are equally connected—it is the reward
structure that licenses the particular fragmentation.
Against our expectations (21) we did not find a correlation be-
tween verbal IQ and the average length of fragments. This is possibly
because the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) used here is
more a measure of verbal than fluid IQ. Alternatively, optimality in
this task implies efficient selection of paths at the least computa-
tional cost. It is conceivable that the prediction should have been the
opposite: that participants with higher IQ should have smaller av-
erage fragment length but achieve similar outcomes. A mixture
between these two effects may explain the current null finding.
Memoization and Option Generation. One important insight that
has engendered extensive research in decision making over the
past decade is the distinction between goal-directed decisions
and cached habits. Whereas the former suffer the sort of com-
putational complexities that justify fragmentation, the latter suf-
fer from a requirement for sampling from the world, or a model
thereof: Instead of thinking through the future, the consequences
of choices are experienced, and these experiences are cached to
determine future choices (3, 28). Memoization is explicitly a form
of caching, exhibiting the signature characteristic that if the envi-
ronment suddenly changes (for instance via outcome devaluation
or contingency degradation) the cached values will remain the
same, and so control based on them will look maladaptive.
One common formalization of cached habit is in terms of state-
action or Q values (29), which estimate the long-run utility that
would be accrued from a state given a particular first action. A
similar process might be applied to entire action sequences (6).
However, these values depend on the depth of the problem, or
subproblem, being solved, and because this is not fixed in the cur-
rent problem these approaches provide little traction. Instead,
stochastic memoization invites consideration of what might be
a simpler form of cached habit, namely, a fixed sequence of actions
(5, 11), which is like a macroaction or option (1). The equivalent of
progressive habitization arises naturally from Eq. 2, because the
probability of performing a whole new tree search (i.e., sampling
from the base measure) decreases with the number of relevant trials
so far. However, note that our form of stochastic memoization was
independent of reward (i.e., memoization did not depend on the
actual quality of the solution produced; it is therefore more like
a refined form of choice kernel); indeed, it is known that nonhuman
primate choices, for instance, depend substantially on their own past
choices, above and beyond the rewards associated with the decisions
(30, 31). Similar arguments have been made for human choices in
a variety of tasks and settings (32, 33) and have been argued to be
under dopaminergic (34) and serotonergic (35) control.
Materials and Methods
Participants. We recruited 41 healthy volunteers (21 female; 23.3 ± 3.7 y) via
the University College London psychology subject pool. They were screened
for past and present psychiatric disorders (including drug and alcohol abuse)
with the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory (36). Subjects with
past or current axis I diagnosis were excluded (one participant was excluded
owing to previous substance dependence). Subjects completed the WTAR
(37) (mean = 111, SD = 4.2) to assess IQ. The study was approved by the
University College London Graduate School Ethics Committee. Subjects pro-
vided written, informed consent and were remunerated based on perfor-
mance, up to a maximum of £40.
Task. The task is described in Fig. 1 and was adapted for functional MRI (fMRI)
from one described in detail elsewhere (4) and programmed in Cogent 2000
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent), a stimulus presentation toolbox for MATLAB
(version 7.1). The fMRI results will be reported elsewhere, and we here re-
port analyses only of the behavior of the same 37 subjects included there.
Subjects were first extensively trained on the transition and reward matrix
and all passed a test. Each of 90 trials of the main experiment began in
a random starting state, but the combination of starting state and depth
were biased such that in 60 trials it was optimal to transition through large
losses, whereas in 30 trials the optimal path did not involve transition
through a large loss. As part of the training, subjects had performed 32 trials
that matched those of the main experiment, but in 18 of which there was no
time restriction. The analyses presented here include these training trials.
The experiment contained additional “restricted plan” trials, where subjects
chose between two predefined paths, as a control condition for the fMRI
analysis. These trials were not analyzed here.
Fragmentation. This model subdivided action sequences. The probability of
a sequence a was represented as the product of the probability of K frag-
ment action sequences:
p

ajs,d,QP=p

að1Þ
s,d

∏Kk=2p

aðkÞ
aðk−1Þ,s,d,QP

, [1]
where s and d denote start state and overall depth. The probabilities depend
on the value QP from the baseline model that includes pruning and loss
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sensitivity (Supporting Information, Pruning). The ðkÞ’th fragment aðkÞ starts
where the ðk− 1Þ’th fragment aðk−1Þ ends, hence the dependence of fragment
aðkÞ on fragment aðk−1Þ. A sequence of length d can be subdivided into frag-
ments of lengths 1 to d in 2d−1 different ways. For instance, a sequence of
length 3 could be composed of three sequences of lengths 1, a single sequence
of length 3, a sequence of length 2 followed by a length-1 sequence, or a se-
quence of length 1 followed by a sequence of length 2. Because the identity of
the particular fragmentation used by a subject is not known, this needs to be
integrated out. On each step of the group fitting procedure (4) we applied
an expectation-maximization procedure to each individual subject to infer
both parameters of the base model and the fragmentation used on each
particular trial.
Stochastic Memoization. This model allowed for the reuse of fragments. Each
entire action sequence was again subdivided as above into k segments. The
probability of generating the particular segment aðkÞ was the sum of two
components. The first component was the probability if it was recomputed
(i.e., the probability assigned to it by the baseline model; see Supporting
Information, Pruning). The second component was proportional to how
frequently that particular fragment action aðkÞ had been emitted in that
particular state up to that point. That is, the probability of emitting a frag-
ment aðkÞ was formalized as a Dirichlet process with the choice probability
distribution from the baseline model pðaðkÞQpÞ serving as the base measure.
Let nsdðkÞ be the total number of times a subject has emitted a fragment of
depth dðkÞ in state s so far, and nsdðkÞðaðkÞÞ the number of times the subject
chose the fragment aðkÞ. The probability of an action is then a sum of two
components, weighted by a parameter α:
p

aðkÞ
s,dðkÞ,n

=
nsdðkÞ

aðkÞ

nsdðkÞ+ α
+
α
α+nsdðkÞ
p

aðkÞ
Qp

: [2]
As α→∞, only the second factor involving pðajQpÞ remains and this model
reduces to the previous “pruning” model. However, as α→0, the probability
distribution becomes dominated by the past choices: Whichever fragment aðkÞ
was most frequently chosen up to that point is most likely to be chosen again.
Hence, α serves as a measure of how strongly past choices determine current
choices. Furthermore, as n grows with time, the second term vanishes whereas
the first term remains Oð1Þ. Thus, over time, this model assumes that subjects
rarely reevaluate the tree by computing Qp, but rather mostly sample from
their past choices proportionally to the past choice frequency. Because the
identity of the fragmentation is not known, inference involves a sum over all
possible fragmentation histories. Because this is not tractable, we approxi-
mate inference with a Viterbi-like scheme, where at each trial the most likely
fragmentation is assumed to have been chosen and the history terms n
updated accordingly.
Model Fitting and Model Comparison.We applied a nested model comparison
strategy. We start from the simplest model and always evaluate whether
additional model complexity is warranted by computing approximate Bayes
factors (the integrated group-level BIC scores; see ref. 4) for each model. All
models were fitted using MATLAB version 8.0 (MathWorks). We used the
parallel processing toolbox and the function fminunc. All parameters were
transformed to lie on the real line for inference. Models had the following
number of parameters: lookahead, 1; discount, 2; pruning, 3; pruning + loss,
6; pruning + loss + restricted fragmentation, 24; and pruning + loss + re-
stricted fragmentation + reuse, 25. See Supporting Information, Robustness
for an assessment of the robustness of this approach.
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